European State Formation and Three Models of Nation-Building:
Explaining the Variation in State Policies toward Ethnic Diversity

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Abstract

How do state policies toward ethnic diversity vary across countries? How can one measure and conceptualize cross-national variation in state policies toward ethnic diversity? What explains such variation? This article presents cross-national data on nine state policies toward ethnic diversity in 42 European countries, collected through a global expert survey over four years (2011-2014), which is the empirical core of the current article. Second, it is demonstrated that there is significant cross-national variation in state policies toward ethnic diversity, with three meaningful patterns clustering in particular countries. Three different nation-building patterns are identified and conceptualized as antiethnic, monoethnic, and multiethnic nation-state models. Third, it is argued that three waves of nation-building, roughly corresponding to French (1789), German (1871), and Soviet (1924) nation-building experiences, and the diffusion of these three models across Europe through chronological, geographical, linguistic, and ideological mechanisms, explain the cross-national variation in state policies toward ethnic diversity.
1 Introduction

Modern nation-states demonstrate considerable variation in terms of the policies they pursue toward ethnic and religious diversity. In France, there is no ethnic or religious information in the national census or in personal identification documents, there is no ethnic-priority immigration or citizenship, no ethnic minority status, only one official language and no more than one ethnic group in the constitution, no ethnic territorial autonomy and no ethnically based affirmative action policies. In stark contrast, in neighboring Belgium, there are multiple official languages, more than one ethnic group in the constitution, ethnic territorial autonomy, ethnic information in the census, and ethnic affirmative action policies. On the other, Germany, the largest and most populous neighbor of both Belgium and France, lacks all of the aforementioned policies that Belgium has in place toward ethnic diversity, but instead maintains ethnic priority immigration and ethnic priority citizenship policies along with ethnic minority status, none of which exist in Belgium or France. Located in the northwestern corner of the European continent, these three neighboring countries demonstrate radically different policies toward ethnic diversity.

How do state policies toward ethnic diversity vary across countries? How can one measure and conceptualize cross-national variation in state policies toward ethnic diversity? What explains such variation? What do these significant differences in state policies toward ethnic diversity tell us about the origins of nation-states and their distribution across time and space? This article presents cross-national data on 9 state policies toward ethnic diversity in 42 European countries, collected through a global
expert survey over four years (2011-2014), which is the empirical core of the current article’s contribution to the social scientific literature on this subject. Second, it is demonstrated that there is systematic and significant cross-national variation in state policies toward ethnic diversity, with three meaningful patterns of policy clustering in particular countries. Three different nation-building patterns are identified and conceptualized as antiethnic, monoethnic, and multiethnic nation-state models, which is the conceptual contribution of the current article.

Third, an attempt is made to explain the distribution of these three nation-building models across Europe with reference to diffusion mechanisms shaped by chronological, geographical, and linguistic factors, which is the causal contribution of the current article. It is argued that the antiethnic nation-building model was chronologically the first one to appear and is best represented by the French Republic that was founded after the French Revolution (1789). This model had a vast demonstration effect on the states that already existed prior to 1789, which are concentrated in Western Europe. This nation-building model also diffused through French-speaking elites that played the leading role in nation-building elsewhere. Monoethnic nation-building model appeared later, best represented by Germany that was founded in 1871, and had a vast demonstration effect on the states that were founded during the 19th and early 20th century, which are concentrated in Eastern Europe. This nation-building model also diffused through German-speaking elites that played the leading role in nation-building. Multiethnic nation-building model had an early example in Belgium (1830) but it was best represented worldwide by the Soviet Union that was founded in 1924, and had a legacy that continues in some of the
successor states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, while diffusing through pro-Soviet elites that played the leading role in nation-building elsewhere during the 20th century.

These different but related empirical, conceptual, and causal contributions address important lacunae in the social scientific study of nationalism and nation-state formation, as the next section will elaborate.

2 Nationalism and the Nation-States: Uniform or diverse trajectories?

There are many competing theories about the origins of nationalism and the rise of nation-states, but despite their differences otherwise, scholars agree that nationalism originated somewhere in Western Europe sometime in the early modern era (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Kedourie 1960; Tilly 1992). “Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century,” avers Elie Kedourie (1960) in the very first sentence of his well-known book on nationalism. Both Anderson and Gellner emphasize that the rise of literacy in vernacular languages and the concomitant decline of Latin as the lingua franca of the elite in Christendom were key developments underpinning popular nationalism and nation-state formation.

Common to all of these theories of nationalism is the expectation that one language becomes the national language, and in many cases, an ethnic group associated with that language is identified and elevated as the core of the new national community. Nation-states are assumed to be monolingual, if not also monoethnic, and nationalism is sometimes assumed to have only one form, “ethnic nationalism,” thus creating ethnically based exclusions and grievances among minorities. “Nationalism demands that rulers and ruled hail from the same ethnic background” is the first sentence of Andreas Wimmer’s
award-winning recent book (2013: 1), where he develops a general theory of nation state formation as well as the global diffusion of the nation state form over two hundred years. However, Wimmer’s aforementioned statement is only accurate in the case of (mono)ethnic nation-building, as the current paper will point out.¹ Some scholars go even further and claim that pre-modern ethnic communities were the precursors of modern nations (Smith 1983; Gat 2013). Regardless of whether they think nations are relatively new formations (e.g., Gellner 1983), or more than a thousand years old (e.g., Gat 2013), most scholars maintain that nationalism creates ethnic inequalities, grievances and conflicts such as civil wars (e.g., Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug 2013; Wimmer 2013).

These accounts of ethnic exclusion rest on the assumption that each nation-state will favor one ethnicity or at least one language, which is an empirical claim that is systematically scrutinized across 42 nations in this article. For example, it will be demonstrated that only some nation-states have official ethnic favoritism in key policy areas such as citizenship and immigration, and most others do not. While many states do have one official national language, some others have multiple official languages at the local or even at the national level. Moreover, some nation-states explicitly mention multiple ethnic groups in their constitution, while some provide for ethnic territorial autonomy and affirmative action policies and quotas for different ethnic groups, which are policies in seeming contradiction with the definition of a nation-state based on one core or titular ethnic group.

¹ There are many other instances where Wimmer defines nationalism as “ethnic” self-rule. “They can now evoke the very principles of nationalism—that ethnic likes should be ruled by ethnic likes—to legitimize their claims and mobilize followers.” (Wimmer 2013: 24) “All remain related, however, to the principles of legitimacy—ethnic self-rule—that the nation-state established, and circle around the issue of ethnic underrepresentation and the fear of political domination by ethnic others.” (Wimmer 2013: 29)
The extant scholarship on nationalism is mostly silent on the question of measuring or explaining the distribution of different nation-building models, although there has been some interest in conceptualizing different nation-building models based on small-N research designs, as will be pointed out below. Nation-states are not uniform in their policies toward ethnic diversity, even in Western Europe as the references to Belgium, France, and Germany earlier demonstrated. Thus, in discussing the interface of nationality and ethnicity, one cannot and should not assume that “the nation-state” has uniform policies, but rather one should specify the national-ethnic identity nexus in a given country based on observable set of institutions and policies regulating the relationship between ethnicity and nationality.

Some scholars challenged the assumed uniformity of the nation-state, hence giving rise to a discussion of what could be described as the “varieties of nation-states.” Hans Kohn’s (1944) classification of “ethnic Eastern” and “civic Western” nationalism as the two subtypes has been popular and influential, but also widely criticized (Kuzio 2002). Nonetheless, Rogers Brubaker’s (1992) study of Germany and France as cases of ethnic and civic nationhood, respectively, followed Kohn’s classification and has also been particularly influential. Liah Greenfeld (1993) identified different types of nationalisms based on whether they have ethnic or civic, collectivistic or individualistic characteristics, based on her study of England, France, Russia, Germany, and the United States. All of these valuable studies were exercises in “conceptualization” based on small-N research design with typically two to five country-specific case studies, with very limited “operationalization” of these concepts. Hence, they did not focus on developing a systematic “measurement” with cross-national applicability that could
uncover the regional or global distribution of various types of nation-states, which is
exactly what this article seeks to achieve with a fully operational new conceptualization
of three types of nation-building based on nine observable policies and institutions.

As a notable exception, the study of immigration policies from the perspective of
nation-building has been fruitful in identifying some cross-national variation in
approaching ethnic diversity. For example, Stephen Castles (1995) suggested a typology
consisting of three types of policy models vis-à-vis immigrants: The differential
exclusion model, the assimilation model, and the pluralist model. Working on early
twentieth century nation-building in southeastern Europe, Harris Mylonas (2013) also
favors a tripartite typology whereby states have the options of exclusion, assimilation,
and accommodation vis-à-vis “non-core groups” under their rule. Ruud Koopmans
(2010) identified different models depending on the combination of policies related to
identity and socio-economic welfare of immigrants: Those that combine multicultural
policies with a generous welfare state (Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden), those that
have “restrictive or assimilationist integration policies” (Germany, Austria, Switzerland,
France) or “a relatively lean welfare state” (the United Kingdom). These studies also
indicate that there is no uniform set of policies that all nation-states employ but rather
there are diverse trajectories of nation-building, whether one is speaking about
immigration and citizenship policies (Brubaker 1992; Koopmans 2010) or policies
toward autochthonous minorities (Mylonas 2013), both at the moment of nation-state
creation (Kohn 1944; Greenfeld 1993; Mylonas 2013) and also continuing at present
(Castles 1995; Koopmans 2010).
Despite these valuable contributions, the extant literature on varieties of nation-building has three major shortcomings: First shortcoming is the limited number of countries considered in these studies, ranging from just two (Brubaker 1992) to as much as eight (Koopmans 2010), which are usually chosen on the basis of an independent variable such as economic development level or political regime type, and hence might introduce a bias in the case selection by arbitrarily narrowing the variation in nation-building policies and types of nationhood that are found. The second and much more significant shortcoming is the limited number of policy areas studied. Typically these studies either only focus on immigration and citizenship policies (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Koopmans 2010) or they focus on state policies toward autochthonous ethnic groups (Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug 2013; Wimmer 2013). Third shortcoming is the lack of a fully operational conceptualization of the various ways in which ethnicity-nationality nexus can be governed, which would provide a theoretical frame for the research and relate it to studies of nation-building. This paper offers an integrated approach that takes into account state policies toward ethnic diversity in all fields that impinge on the internal and external definition of nationhood, including immigration and citizenship policy as well as policies that amount to official recognition of internal ethnic diversity such as ethnic federalism, multiple official languages, and the existence of multiple official categories in the constitution, census, and personal identification documents. As such, a fully operational conceptualization of three types of nation-building (antiethnic, monoethnic, and multiethnic) based on nine observable policies and institutions, which is a systematic “measurement” with cross-national applicability that can capture the distribution of various types of nation-states, is presented below. This is
followed by the presentation of the cross-national data on 9 state policies in 42 European countries collected through an expert opinion survey, which provides the first systematic overview of as many state policies toward ethnic diversity in 42 European states that can be accurately labeled as the “big picture” of different nation-state models across Europe. Third and finally, a tentative explanation of the distribution of three nation-building models across Europe is provided in the last section, with reference to diffusion mechanisms shaped or conditioned by chronological, geographical, and linguistic factors.

3 Conceptualization: Antiethnic, Monoethnic, and Multiethnic Nation-Building

Ethnic diversity is related to two aspects of any modern political community, namely, “membership” and “expression” dimensions, which in turn are governed and regulated through a number of policies in every country. First, “membership” dimension is primarily regulated by two policies, immigration and citizenship. The key question is whether the state limits citizenship and immigration (i.e., “membership”) to only one ethnic category, or not. Ethnic priority immigration, for example, was a widespread policy employed even by liberal Western countries such as Australia and the United States until the second half of the 20th century, as Christian Joppke (2005) demonstrated in his study of ethnic migration in the liberal state. A third policy that is also relevant for the membership dimension, but not as important as the first two, is whether there is ethnic minority status, which would implicate the rest of the population as an “ethnic majority” or titular ethnicity.

Secondly, “expression” dimension is related to whether and how the state officially supports the expression of ethnic diversity among its citizenry. There are six
policies through which the state can officially recognize and support the expression of ethnic diversity among its citizenry: The existence of multiple official languages, multiple ethnic categories in the constitution, ethnic federalism, ethnic information in the census, ethnic information in individual identification documents, and ethnically based affirmative action. These nine policies, the first three related to ethnic membership and the latter six related to ethnic expression dimension of nationality, conceptualized together indicate one of three different nation-building models, or hybrids thereof.

First, if the state does not limit citizenship and immigration to any one particular ethnic group, thus accepting people of many different ethnicities as immigrants and citizens, but also does not allow for the official expression of ethnic diversity through the six policies mentioned earlier, then this state pursues antiethnic nation-building. Among the three countries mentioned as examples in the introduction, France is an unmistakable example of a state that pursues antiethnic nation-building.

Second, if the state privileges one ethnic group as the true core of the nation through discriminatory citizenship and immigration regulations, but also does not allow for the official expression of ethnic diversity through the six policies mentioned earlier, then this state pursues monoethnic nation-building. Among the three countries mentioned as examples in the introduction, Germany is an unmistakable example of a state that pursues monoethnic nation-building.

Third, if the state does not limit citizenship and immigration to any one particular ethnic group, thus accepting people of many different ethnicities as immigrants and citizens, and also supports the official expression of ethnic diversity through the six policies mentioned earlier, then this state pursues multiethnic nation-building. Among the
three countries mentioned as examples in the introduction, Belgium is an unmistakable example of a state that pursues *multiethnic* nation-building (Table 1).

Table 1: Three Types of Nation-Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Antiethnic</th>
<th>Monoethnic</th>
<th>Multiethnic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic priority citizenship</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic priority immigration</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority status</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple ethnic categories in the constitution</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple official languages</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic territorial autonomy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic information in the census</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic information in individual IDs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic affirmative action</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following section, systematic data on nine state policies toward ethnic diversity in forty-two European countries is presented, which demonstrates the distribution of antiethnic, monoethnic, and multiethnic nation-building models across Europe. This is a novel accomplishment that promises to advance the state of the art in the study of nation-building policies and identity politics in Europe.
4 Data: Expert Opinion Survey on State Policies toward Ethnic Diversity

In order to answer the questions outlined earlier, a global expert opinion survey on state policies toward ethnic diversity was conducted with the generous support of the European Commission through a Marie Curie International Reintegration Grant (project no. 268392) between 2011 and 2014. The goal was to collect completed questionnaires on fifteen state policies toward ethnic diversity and religion from experts of 172 countries with a population over quarter million. Ideally, we would like to collect completed questionnaires from three experts per country, but this was not possible for every one of the 172 countries. 2,442 experts were contacted in total, and 485 completed surveys were received from experts of 172 countries, corresponding to a positive response rate of 19.9%. These completed surveys contained 7,275 policy-specific data points in total (15 policies evaluated in each of the 485 surveys). The results for 42 geographically European countries are presented in this paper. These include every country that has territory in the European continent (including Russia and Turkey) or in nearby islands that are conventionally considered European or are members of the European Union (including Cyprus, Iceland, and Malta), with a population over quarter million.

Country experts were identified by a team of research assistants in close consultation with the current author, primarily based on their publication record on ethnic politics or ethnic identity in the country for which their expertise was sought. Publications were identified using online search engines in academic databases such as Google Scholar. Respondents were asked to provide their expert opinion on the existence or lack of nine state policies toward ethnic diversity and six state policies toward religion. They had a binary choice (“yes” or “no”) to indicate the existence or lack thereof for each
policy, followed by the option of explaining each of their responses. The experts had the option to disclose their identities or remain anonymous in any future publications resulting from this survey. The names of 383 experts who agreed to the disclosure of their identities are publicly available in the project website. The remainder of the experts chose to remain anonymous.

5 Overview of Policies toward Ethnic Diversity in 42 European Countries

Ethnic Membership

5.1 Ethnic Priority Citizenship

Officially sanctioned preference for one ethnic category in naturalization and citizenship acquisition is one of the two major policies that is an unmistakable sign of a monoethnic nation-building model. 19 of the 42 European countries (45%) including Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain have ethnic priority citizenship policies. It is significant that 14 of these 19 countries form a geographically contiguous territory extending from Denmark, Germany, and Poland in the north to Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus in the southeast, whereas Latvia and Finland in the northeast are in their close proximity. A majority of European states, 23 out of 42 (55%), do not have ethnic priority citizenship policies.

5.2 Ethnic Priority Immigration

Officially sanctioned preference for one ethnic category in immigration, sometimes in the form of a separate “repatriation” law or program, is the second major
policy that is an unmistakable symptom of a monoethnic nation-building model. Ethnic priority immigration is in some ways the strongest symptom of a monoethnic nation-building model, since it shows the state’s interest in, if not active pursuit of, “ethnic brethren” around the world as prospective citizens. 14 out of 42 European countries (33%) including Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Spain have ethnic priority immigration policies. It is very significant that all of these 14 countries also have ethnic priority citizenship policies, making them very strong candidates for monoethnic nationhood. There is a pronounced preference for increasing the numbers of one ethnic category among members of the political community, and as such monoethnic countries fit Wimmer’s definition of nationalism and nation-state as being based on “ethnic self-rule” where “ethnic likes should be ruled by ethnic likes.” (2003: 1, 24, 29) Barring significant contradictory policies among the other seven policies, these 14 countries are strong candidates for monoethnic nationhood.

5.3 Ethnic Minority Status

Although it might appear counterintuitive, ethnic minority status is also a policy that is symptomatic of monoethnic nation-building, because designating a small (minor) segment of the population as an “ethnic” minority, identifies the rest of the population as the “ethnic majority” by implication. However, ethnic minority status is the weakest symptom of monoethnic nationhood among the three policies of membership. 22 out of 42 European countries (52%), including Albania, Austria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Kosovo, Latvia, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Ukraine have
Ethnic minority status. 9 out of these 22 countries with ethnic minority status also have both ethnic priority citizenship and ethnic priority immigration, designating one ethnic category as the core or titular ethnic group of the country, making these 9 countries the strongest candidates of monoethnic nationhood. These include, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Slovenia, and Spain. However, as will be observed further below, a few of the countries that have two or three major policies symptomatic of monoethnic membership in the nation, also have a significant number of policies allowing for multiethnic expression, which will be the basis of their classification under the hybrid category of “monoethnic-multiethnic” nation-building.

**Ethnic Expression**

There are six state policies directly related to the official recognition and promotion of ethnic diversity. Among these six, three policies are stronger indicators of multiethnic nationhood: Multiple ethnic categories in the constitution, multiple official languages, especially if these are recognized at the national level rather than the local level, and ethnic territorial autonomy. The other three policies that are also indicative of multiethnic nationhood are ethnic information in the census, ethnic information in individual identification documents, and ethnic affirmative action policies.

**5.4 Multiple Ethnic Categories in the Constitution**

Mentioning more than one ethnic group in the constitution, the key document of any modern state, is an unmistakable indication of the multiethnic nation-building model at the highest official level. 10 out of 42 European countries (24%) have more than one ethnic group mentioned in their constitution, including Austria, Belgium, Croatia,
Cyprus, Finland, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, and Slovenia. The number of ethnic groups mentioned in the Constitution varies significantly, from just one ethnic group in Norway (Saami) to twenty-three ethnic groups in Croatia.

5.5 Multiple Official Languages

Having multiple official languages, even at the local level, is another strong indicator of recognizing ethnic diversity among the citizenry. 23 out of 42 European countries (55%) have multiple official languages, including Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine. However, it is important to note that most of these countries recognize more than one official language at the local level, not at the national level. There are nine countries, such as Belgium, that recognize multiple official languages at the national level. Furthermore, even within the smaller subcategory of nationally multilingual countries, several of them are bilingual in great part because of their post-imperial heritage (such as the official bilingualism of Belarus, Finland, Ireland, and Malta). Nonetheless, official multilingualism, even at the local level, is an important symptom of multiethnic nation building.

5.6 Ethnic Territorial Autonomy

Existence of ethnic territorial autonomy is perhaps the strongest indication of multiethnic nationhood, since it often implies sharing sovereignty between two or more ethnic groups on a territorial basis. Only 8 out of 42 European countries (19%) have ethnic territorial autonomy including Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Finland, Moldova, Norway, Russia, and Spain. The size and the population of the
ethnically autonomous territories vary considerably among these nine. It is notable that three of the eight European countries with ethnic territorial autonomy are Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, and Norway) and three others are post-Communist (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and Russia). Belgium and Spain, however, do not fall under these two categories and yet they also have ethnic territorial autonomy. Belgium, Finland, and Norway are the three countries that also have multiple ethnic categories in the constitution, multiple official languages, and ethnic territorial autonomy, making these three countries as strong candidates of multiethnic nationhood. However, since Finland also has all three policies indicative of monoethnic nationhood, it presents us with a clear case of hybrid monoethnic-multiethnic nation-building.

5.7 Ethnic Information in the Census

Among the policies related to the expression of ethnic diversity of the citizenry (although sometimes non-citizens may also be included in the census), ethnic information in the national census is the most widespread one. 28 out of 42 European countries (67%), a full two-thirds, collect ethnically specific information in their national census. These countries include Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom. Neither antiethnic nor monoethnic nation-states would be expected to have ethnic information in the census. Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey do not have ethnic information in their national census. Therefore, these countries that do not have any ethnic information in the
census are likely followers of antiethnic nation-building model seeking to assimilate an ethnically diverse population or a monoethnic nation-building model that seeks to exclude all ethnic others from citizenship.

5.8 Ethnic Information in Individual Identification Documents

Some countries maintain records on every individual citizen’s ethnic identity, often in their passports, birth certificates, or other government issued personal identification cards. This is also an important symptom of multiethnic nation-building, because through such records the state recognizes the ethnic diversity and ethnic identity of every one of its citizens. Moreover, such mandatory recognition often reinforces the ethnic identities of the citizens in their interactions with public authorities. Individual ethnic records can serve as the microfoundation of a vast multiethnic institutional architecture such as in the former Soviet Union, where ethnically based affirmative action and dozens of ethnically autonomous territories with their respective official languages existed along with the codification of every citizen’s ethnic identity in their internal passports (Martin 2001; Akturk 2010). 11 out of 42 European countries (26%) currently have ethnic records of their individual citizens, including Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, and the Netherlands. It is a very significant observation that 9 of the 11 countries that keep ethnic records of their subjects are Post-Communist countries. Soviet Union, the first modern socialist state, began the practice of recording every individual’s ethnicity and other socialist states such as Yugoslavia and the People’s Republic of China also continued this practice, which indicate that the prevalence of this policy in post-Communist countries might be a historical legacy.
5.9 Ethnic Affirmative Action

In a multiethnic nation-building model, the census codifies the ethnic demography of the citizenry at an aggregate level, while personal identification documents codify ethnic identities at an individual level, and based on either one or both of these policies, some states also implement ethnically based affirmative action policies. 14 out of 42 European countries implement ethnic affirmative action policies, including Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 13 of these 14 countries either have individual ethnic records or ethnic information in their census, or both. The only exception is Finland, which neither has ethnic information in its census nor individual ethnic records but it has ethnically based affirmative action. It is also a significant observation that in half of the European countries where ethnic affirmative action exists, it is mostly or entirely targeted toward one specific ethnic category, the Roma ethnic group, and often with the specific goal of promoting their education. Roma are the intended beneficiaries of ethnic affirmative action in the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Kosovo, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia.

6 Identifying Antiethnic, Monoethnic, and Multiethnic Regimes in Europe

Based on the results of the cross-national expert opinion survey on state policies toward ethnic diversity in 42 European countries discussed above, we can identify and classify the differences in their nation-building strategies. Countries that pursue antiethnic nation-building are expected not to have any of the nine policies examined. Countries that pursue monoethnic nation-building are expected to have three polices,
namely, ethnic priority citizenship, ethnic priority immigration, and ethnic minority status, since these designate one ethnic group as the titular, state-bearing ethnicity that is identified as the core of the nation, but they are expected not to have any of the six policies on ethnic expression, since a nation defined as monoethnic is not supposed to have any ethnic diversity. Finally, countries that follow multiethnic nation-building are expected to have all six policies of multiethnic expression but they are not expected to have any of the three monoethnic membership policies. Looking at these nine policies as a whole, if any country fully conforms with or deviates in only one or two policies from the expected pattern for a particular nation-building model, then it is reasonable to classify that country as an example of that nation-building pattern. Thus, any country that demonstrates conformity with a particular nation-building pattern in at least seven of the nine policies examined will be classified as belonging to that nation-building model.

Even displaying expected outcomes in seven of the nine ethnic policies may still not be sufficient for classifying a country as an example of a particular nation-building model if the country does not have neither one of the two membership policies for a particular nation-building model. For example, a country cannot be pursuing monoethnic nation-building if it does not have either ethnic priority citizenship or ethnic priority immigration. If a country deviates in three or more policies from the expected policy patterns of the hypothesized nation-building models, then it is labeled as a “hybrid” of two nation-building models depending on the particular constellation of policies.

If the number of countries labeled as “hybrids” exceed the number of countries that display the policy patterns of the three hypothesized nation-building models, this could decrease our confidence in the tripartite conceptualization of antiethnic,
monoethnic, and multiethnic nation-building models discussed earlier. On the other hand, if the state policies toward ethnic diversity in a majority of the 42 countries under investigation can be captured by one of the three nation-building models conceptualized earlier in this article, then our confidence in this conceptualization would increase. Indeed, state policies toward ethnic diversity in 28 of the 42 European countries, or two-thirds of all countries, do fit neatly into the tripartite typology of antiethnic, monoethnic, and multiethnic nation-building, increasing our confidence in this conceptualization.

**Antiethnic Nation-Building**

9 of the 42 European countries (21.5%) conform to the antiethnic nation-building pattern, which is based on assimilation in its approach to ethnic diversity. Of these, France, Portugal, and Turkey perfectly fit into the antiethnic nation-building model since all nine of their policies toward ethnic diversity are in line with what one would expect in an antiethnic regime, not recognizing, codifying or institutionalizing ethnic identities in their policies on membership or expression. The remaining six countries (Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) are in conformity with the antiethnic nation-building pattern in seven or eight of their nine policies toward ethnic diversity, but they do have one or two policies of multiethnic expression, which nonetheless does not jeopardize their overall antiethnic orientation in nation-building. Despite their varying levels of conformity with the antiethnic policy pattern, it is important to observe and emphasize that none of these eleven countries has either ethnic priority citizenship or ethnic priority immigration policies, providing a stronger indication of conformity with the antiethnic pattern than a mere aggregate number of policies may suggest (Table 2). Another very notable observation on the distribution of
antiethnic regimes is a geographical one: All of the antiethnic nation-states, except for Turkey, are located in Western Europe, which may indicate a geographical diffusion mechanism, as will be discussed in the next section.

While a discussion of every antiethnic nation-state is impossible due to the space limitations of this article, classification of Switzerland as an antiethnic country might appear anomalous and surprising at first, and thus it deserves a brief explanation. Switzerland only has one of the nine policies included in our survey, multiple official languages, and it lacks the other five policies of multiethnic expression, and hence was categorized as an antiethnic regime (Table 2). Swiss constitution does not mention multiple ethnic groups, as all experts concurred, but rather it mentions four different language groups. Switzerland does not have ethnic territorial autonomy, although there is a kind of linguistic autonomy since some cantons have a single predominant language, while some are more diverse. There is no record of ethnic or even linguistic or religious belonging in personal identification cards or passports. There is no ethnically based affirmative action. As to whether there is ethnic information in the census, the experts were evenly divided, but upon closer inspection, it appears that “language, religion, and nationality” are recorded in the Swiss census, but not ethnicity.

The only official policy of multiethnic expression in Switzerland appears to be the recognition of multiple official languages, which is a very important and distinctively multicultural characteristic of the Swiss nation-state, but in the absence of the other five policies, does not suffice to define Switzerland as a multiethnic nation-state in terms of the official, legal, and institutional features examined in this article. However, Switzerland is a country with a highly decentralized power structure (“confederation”)
where most units of the confederation also have a predominant linguistic identity that in effect corresponds to an ethno-cultural identity, and this rather rare constellation resembles, *de facto*, multiethnic nation building, even though, as discussed above, there are no explicitly “ethnic” power-sharing principles officially codified underpinning the national political architecture in Switzerland. To a lesser extent, the same can be said for the United Kingdom, which officially does not have any of the policies of multiethnic expression except for recording ethnic identity in the national census, although some of the British policies can be interpreted as amounting to *de facto* ethnic territorial autonomy, ethnic affirmative action, and recognition of multiple official languages.

Table 2. Antiethnic Nation-States in Europe

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</table>
Monoethnic Nation-Building

12 of the 42 European countries (28.5%) conform to the monoethnic nation-building pattern, which is based on exclusion of the non-titular, non-core ethnic groups in its approach to ethnic diversity. Paralleling extant literature on varieties of nationalism, Germany continues to appear as the most faithful approximation of the monoethnic nation-building model (Brubaker 1992; Greenfeld 1993). This is somewhat surprising given the historic citizenship reform of 1999, which allowed the naturalization of non-ethnic Germans born in Germany to immigrant parents who fulfill certain qualifications (Akturk 2012). However, Germany still maintains ethnic priority citizenship and ethnic priority immigration for ethnic Germans throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, while also having ethnic minority status, and not having any of the six policies of multiethnic expression, which is exactly the constellation of policies that one expects from a state on a monoethnic nation-building trajectory. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania deviate in only one or at most two policies from this monoethnic pattern, while conforming to that pattern in the other seven or eight policies. Moreover, nine of the twelve monoethnic nation-states (exceptions are Estonia, Poland and Romania) have both ethnic priority citizenship and ethnic priority immigration policies (Table 3). Another notable observation on the distribution of antiethnic regimes is a geographical one: Three-quarters of the countries (9 out of the 12) that have monoethnic nation-building policies are located in Eastern Europe (exceptions are Denmark, Iceland, and Ireland), which may indicate a geographical diffusion mechanism or demonstration effect, as will be discussed in the next section.
Table 3. Monoethnic Nation-States in Europe

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Multiethnic Nation-Building

7 of the 42 European countries (16.5%) conform to the multiethnic nation-building pattern, which is based on the consociation of multiple ethnic groups that are officially recognized together as constituting the nation. These countries are Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, and Russia.
However, none of these seven countries display the multiethnic pattern in all nine policies; they mostly deviate in one or two of these policies from the multiethnic pattern (Table 4). In the special case of Moldova, however, a country that has four of the six policies of multiethnic expression including the two most critical ones (multiple official languages and ethnic territorial autonomy), and does not have monoethnic citizenship or immigration policies but does have officially defined ethnic minority status, it is still reasonable to classify this country as a multiethnic nation-state, rather than an antiethnic-multiethnic hybrid, even though it deviates from the multiethnic pattern in three policies.

A notable observation on the distribution of multiethnic nation-states is a geographical one: All countries that conform to the multiethnic nation-building pattern except for Belgium are located in Eastern Europe, which may indicate a geographical diffusion mechanism or demonstration effect, as will be discussed in the next section. Another observation is the relative scarcity of multiethnic regimes in Europe, compared to both antiethnic and monoethnic regimes. Moreover, there is also a rather interesting asymmetry in the size of these multiethnic nations. While Russia is by far the largest and most populous country in Europe, all the other multiethnic nations, perhaps again with the partial exception of Belgium, have significantly smaller territory and population than the European average, which is already below the average size and population for nation-states worldwide.
Table 4. Multiethnic Nation-States in Europe

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**Monoethnic-Multiethnic Hybrid Nation-Building**

7 of the 42 European countries (17%) combine unmistakably monoethnic citizenship and immigration policies with some of the policies of multiethnic expression, which is a curiously counterintuitive and theoretically incoherent combination. These countries are Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Spain. Similar to monoethnic and multiethnic nation-states, monoethnic-multiethnic nation-states are also almost all located in Eastern Europe with the singular exception of Spain. Most strikingly, Croatia, Finland, and Slovenia have all three monoethnic membership polices and four of the six policies of multiethnic expression.
The policies pursued by these states give the impression that there is clearly a monoethnic “core” of the nation, its “titular” ethnic group (e.g., ethnic Croats), which is officially privileged in citizenship and immigration, but the state also supports some of the policies that give official expression to ethnic diversity of its citizenry. In an apparent case of monoethnic discrimination, state prefers one particular ethnic group in immigration, naturalization and citizenship acquisition, which we may call the titular or core ethnic group, but the state inherited a multiethnic citizenry historically and also implements some policies that give expression to that diversity. Taking into consideration such a configuration with a core, titular, privileged ethnic group at the top, and other ethnic groups that are nonetheless allowed official expression, it would be accurate to describe monoethnic-multiethnic hybrid nation-states as being closer to the monoethnic model than the multiethnic model, while not losing sight of their in-between status. The organizing principle in multiethnic nation-states is that of “consociation” between symbolically equal ethnic groups that together constitute the nation, which is not the case in monoethnic-multiethnic hybrids where one ethnic group is officially privileged as the core of the nation (titular group), while all other ethnic groups are relegated to a secondary status, even though the expression of their ethnic difference is officially supported and institutionalized. Their chronological origins and geographical location likewise can be understood in between two nation-building models, while more closely paralleling that of the monoethnic nation-states. Seemingly incoherent for combining monoethnic discrimination with multiethnic expression, monoethnic-multiethnic hybrid nation-building is surprisingly common in Eastern Europe.
Antiethnic-Multiethnic Hybrid Nation-Building

7 of the 42 European countries (17%) combine antiethnic citizenship and immigration policies with policies of multiethnic expression. These are Albania, Austria, Belarus, Luxembourg, Norway, Serbia, and Ukraine. They have ethnically blind immigration and citizenship policies that allow people of different ethnic backgrounds to become members of the nation, and they have almost half of the policies of multiethnic expression. Unlike monoethnic-multiethnic hybrid, which is incoherent for combining two opposing principles on the definition of the nation, antiethnic-multiethnic hybrid is not incoherent as such, and can also be defined as “semi-multiethnic” nation-building since it is halfway between assimilation of an ethnically diverse population in favor one overarching national identity and full recognition of ethnic diversity within the nation. More than half of the antiethnic-multiethnic nation-states are post-Communist.

7 Explaining the Origins and Diffusion of Different Nation Building Models:
The Role of Chronology, Geography, and Language

How can we explain how and why countries display significant and observable differences in the nation-building policies that they follow? The empirical results of our survey presented in this article demonstrate that there are striking cross-national differences in nation-building policies. Two-thirds of European countries can be classified as following one of three policy patterns that are conceptualized as antiethnic, monoethnic, and multiethnic nation-building earlier in this article. How can one explain this variation? Although there are many theories on the origins and spread of nationalism, these theories lack specific causal mechanisms for explaining why countries adopt
different kinds of nation building models with different policies toward ethnic diversity. In an already noted exception, Kohn (1944) suggested a dichotomous description with a geographical dimension when he argued that Western nationalisms and nation-states are civic whereas Eastern nationalisms and nation-states are ethnic. His argument came under detailed criticism both theoretically for his mystical construction of a “civic” nationalism, and empirically for the cases of nationalism that he mischaracterized or classified inconsistently (Kuzio 2002).

The implicit or default explanation for cross-national variation in nation-building policies is presumably historical contingency and the agency of nationalist leaderships in each country, which can be treated as a null hypothesis. If the policies toward ethnic diversity observed in each country as a whole did not fit into the antiethnic, monoethnic, and multiethnic nation building patterns outlined earlier, then the null hypothesis would have been vindicated. However, they mostly do fit into these three nation-building patterns, and furthermore, there are meaningful geographical, chronological, ideological, and linguistic clusters of countries pursuing similar policies toward ethnic diversity, and therefore such patterns are in need of an explanation beyond historical contingency and agency of political leaders, which is attempted below.

**Three Waves of Nation-Building: Chronology, Geography, and Language**

**French Revolution (1789) and Antiethnic Nation-Building**

Modern nationalism originated in Western Europe, possibly going as far back as the state-led religious homogenization and mobilization observed in early modern England, France, and Spain (Marx 2003). France, Britain, and the United States are often described as “the first national communities.” (Wimmer 2003: 37) The French
Revolution in 1789, which idealized and pursued an assimilationist, *antiethnic* nation-building model, had a spectacular demonstration effect in much of Western Europe, and provided a blueprint for emulation by states that were already in existence by 1789. Only nine present-day European states were already in existence as of 1789: Portugal, Spain, France, Switzerland, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia. It is a significant observation that, even though around one-quarter of all European states (11 out of 42) pursue antiethnic nation-building policies, two-thirds of the states that already existed prior to 1789 (6 out of 9) pursue anti-ethnic nation-building policies. This observation strengthens my argument that the variation in nation-building patterns across Europe can be explained in part by chronology: The oldest states that already existed prior to 1789 mostly adopted antiethnic nation-building policies similar to France.

Part of the explanation for this initial emulation probably has to do with the resounding victories of French armies in the Napoleonic Wars, which is widely believed to have motivated military and political elites of France’s neighbors to emulate French nation-building model. “This had obvious advantages, as the success of Napoleon’s armies demonstrated. The nation-state model was therefore “pirated,” in Benedict Anderson’s terms, by ambitious political leaders across the world and across times.” (Wimmer 2013: 20) However, I would argue that the French model of antiethnic nation-building was only the first of three nation-building models to appear, and therefore different countries “pirated” different models depending on “when, where, and how” they “pirated” it, corresponding to chronological, geographical, and linguistic factors that account for the cross-national variation in state policies toward ethnic diversity.
In addition to the chronological dimension highlighted above, there appears to have been a geographical dimension in this diffusion process, since a large majority of antiethnic nation-states are located in Western Europe. To a certain extent, this is logical since those states most immediately threatened by the new French nation-state would be its neighbors in Western Europe, and hence this may have motivated their emulation of the antiethnic nation-building model.

The chronological and geographical mechanisms briefly discussed above cannot explain the origins of antiethnic nation-states that were founded much later than the French Revolution and are located far away from Western Europe. The paradigmatic example of this phenomenon among 42 European countries is Turkey, which is located at the southeastern tip of Europe and was founded in 1923. However, the third diffusion mechanism may be a linguistic one, whereby primarily French-speaking or French educated nation builders would model their nation states after the French original that they knew best. Therefore, it may be argued that antiethnic nation-building model deeply influenced some of the Francophone nationalist groups such as the Young Turks, who later spearheaded the founding of the Turkish nation-state (Hanioglu 1995, 2001, 2011).

**German Unification (1871) and Monoethnic Nation-Building**

The second, monoethnic, nation-building model originated in the early 19th century, right after the French Revolution, and its most spectacular example was the German Unification in 1871, which influenced likeminded monoethnic nation-builders across Europe. Monoethnic model conceived of ethnicity and nationality as being identical. Monoethnic nation-building trajectory developed, at least in part, in reaction to the French-inspired antiethnic model following the victories of Napoleonic armies across
Europe. It is also important to observe that German Unification of 1871 was achieved precisely at the moment of German victory over France, the country where the first, antiethnic, nation-building model originated.

The question of “why a second type of nation-building developed” goes beyond the scope of this article, since our goal here is to describe the cross-national variation in state policies toward ethnic diversity, conceptualize them as three different nation-building models, and uncover their historical origins and diffusion patterns. In other words, the question as to “why monoethnic and then multiethnic nation-building models emerged following the initial appearance of the antiethnic model” is beyond the scope of this article since it is a further step in the causal chain. Nonetheless, as many intellectual historians of nationalism highlight, German nationalism already began to take shape, for example, in philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s famous *Addresses to the German Nation* that he delivered in Berlin under French occupation in 1807-1808.

As in the diffusion of the antiethnic nation-building model with the French Revolution in 1789, chronology, geography, and language also seem to have played a key role in the diffusion of monoethnic nation-building model. First, chronologically, many nationalist groups that established new nation-states after the French Revolution (1789), in the 19th and early 20th centuries, were influenced by this new form of monoethnic nationalism, whereas the nationalist transformation of the states that already existed before 1789 mostly followed the antiethnic model inspired by the perceived success of Napoleonic France. Second, geographically, most monoethnic nation-states form a contiguous territory extending from Germany, Poland and the Baltic states in northeastern Europe to Bulgaria and Greece in southeastern Europe, hinting at a spatial
diffusion. Third, and perhaps most importantly, German-inspired monoethnic nation-building ideas had a significant influence across Central and Eastern Europe through German-speaking elites (in Habsburg and Prussian lands such as present-day Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland), German settlers (in the Baltic countries), and German monarchs (in Balkan countries such as Greece and Bulgaria), hinting at the importance of elite language and linguistic sphere of influence as key channels through which new ideas including nation-state models travel from their original birthplace.

**Soviet Union (1924) and Multiethnic Nation-Building**

The third, multiethnic nation-building model, which had earlier precedents such as Belgium, emerged as a distinct, well-known and influential option only after the founding of the Soviet Union in 1924. Its advocates presented multiethnic nationhood as the final and morally superior form of organization for the modern political community, in line with the messianic quality of Soviet socialism (Martin 2001). On the other hand, apart from the construction of the Soviet Union, probably the most extensively “multiethnic” modern political community, which had significant influence around the world and also in Eastern Europe, in some cases multiethnic nation-building may also result from the survival of some of the large and ethnically diverse premodern entities, which succeeded in inculcating a modern sense of peoplehood despite the challenge of monoethnic and antiethnic nation-states. Soviet Union itself can be described as a reconstruction of the multiethnic Russian Empire with a thoroughly new ideological legitimation. Elsewhere in Europe, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom come to mind, although these three have only had one or two multiethnic policies at most, instead
mostly favoring antiethnic or even monoethnic policies, as discussed earlier. In Asia, China, Iran, and India come to mind.

Chronology, geography and ideology along with language also underpinned the diffusion of Soviet-inspired multiethnic nation-building model, similar to the diffusion of antiethnic and monoethnic models. First, chronologically, out of seven multiethnic states in Europe today, only one (Russia) dates back to the pre-1789 era and only one (Belgium) was founded between 1789 and 1924, whereas five multiethnic states were established much later than the founding of the Soviet Union in 1924. Second, geographically, six of the seven multiethnic nation-states in Europe are located in Eastern Europe. Third, linguistically and ideologically, six of the seven multiethnic nation-states in Europe are post-Communist states, all of which also had and still have at least one Slavic language as an official language, two significant observations that strengthen the hypothesized causal link between the influence of Soviet socialism and multiethnic nation-building pattern.

Conclusion

Significant cross-national variation is observed in state policies toward ethnic diversity in 42 European countries. This variation can be described through antiethnic, monoethnic, and multiethnic nation building patterns that were conceptualized earlier. Finally, there are meaningful geographical, chronological, ideological, and linguistic clusters of countries pursuing similar policies toward ethnic diversity, which strengthens the current author’s hypothesis that there have been three waves of nation-state formation corresponding to three different nation-building models, which explain most of the variation observed in state policies toward ethnic diversity in Europe.
The patterns observed in the distribution of antiethnic, monoethnic, and multiethnic nation-states across Europe seem to suggest that chronological, geographical, and linguistic mechanisms played an important role in their diffusion. More than half of the states implementing antiethnic policies were established before 1789, whereas 6 of the 10 states implementing monoethnic policies were established between 1789 and 1924, and 5 of the 7 countries implementing multiethnic policies were established after 1924.

There is an observable temporal pattern whereby three-quarters of the states founded before the French Revolution are antiethnic, two-thirds of the states founded between the French Revolution and the founding of the Soviet Union are monoethnic, while the largest number of states established after the founding of the Soviet Union are multiethnic (Table 5).

Table 5. Age of Statehood and Nation-Building Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation-building model/Year of state formation</th>
<th>Antiethnic</th>
<th>Monoethnic</th>
<th>Multiethnic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1789</td>
<td>6 (CH, FR, NL, PT, SE, UK)</td>
<td>1 (DK)</td>
<td>1 (RU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1789-1924</td>
<td>2 (IT, TR)</td>
<td>6 (BG, CZ, DE, GR, PL, RO)</td>
<td>1 (BE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-2008</td>
<td>1 (MT)</td>
<td>5 (IE, EE, IS, LT, LV)</td>
<td>5 (BA, MK, MD, ME, XK)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The countries that follow hybrid monoethnic-multiethnic or antiethnic-multiethnic policies are located at the fault lines between these three nation-building models. Five of the seven countries that follow monoethnic-multiethnic policies are located in Eastern Europe, combining Communist legacies of multiethnic nationhood dating back to the Cold War and legacies of monoethnic nationhood dating back as early as the 19th century.

In conclusion, while the antiethnic nation-building model was the first option available, it faced competition from the German-inspired monoethnic model starting in the early 19th century, and both antiethnic and monoethnic models faced competition from multiethnic nation-building model after the founding of the Soviet Union in 1924. As the number of available options increased, the predominance of any single nation-building model became harder to maintain. Thus, multiethnic model did not enjoy the temporal or geographical predominance that the antiethnic (pre-1789, Western Europe) and monoethnic (19th century, Eastern Europe) models enjoyed earlier because it faced competition from both of these models as some new states continued to be founded on the basis antiethnic or monoethnic nation-building polices throughout the 20th century.

**Bibliography**


