**Majority Measures**

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The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates – and of Condorcet consistency – is challenged. Axioms based on *measures* – paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates that are based on *comparisons* – lead to another method. It is unique in agreeing with the majority rule when the electorate is “polarized” and meets R.A. Dahl’s requirement that a short apathetic majority not defeat an intense minority. It accommodates any number of candidates and avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes.

Robert A. Dahl. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

Kenneth O. May. 1952. “A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision.” *Econometrica* 20 680-684.